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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach to the question of meaning in life by criticizing 
Thaddeus Metz’s objectivist theory in his book Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. I propose the 
concept of “the heart of meaning in life,” which alone can answer the question, “Alas, does my life 
like this have any meaning at all?” and I demonstrate that “the heart of meaning in life” cannot be 
compared, in principle, with other people’s meaning in life. The answer to the question of “the heart 
of meaning in life” ought to have two values, yes-or-no, and there is no ambiguous gray zone 
between them. I believe that this concept constitutes the very central content of meaning in life. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Federico Fellini’s 1954 film, La Strada, the Fool encourages Gelsomina, a 
young female member of a circus troupe who has little talent, little skill, and 
little social value.  
 
THE FOOL: You may not believe it, but everything that exists in the 
world has some purpose. Here . . . take . . . that pebble there, for instance. 
GELSOMINA: Which pebble? 
THE FOOL: Oh . . . this one, any one of them . . . Well . . . even this 
serves some purpose . . . even this little pebble. 
GELSOMINA: And what purpose does it serve? 
THE FOOL: It . . . but how do I know? If I knew, do you know who I’d 
be? 
GELSOMINA: Who? 
THE FOOL: God Almighty who knows everything. When you’re born, 
when you’ll die. Who else could know that? No . . . I don’t know what 
purpose this pebble serves, but it must serve some purpose. Because if it is 
useless, then everything is useless . . . even stars. . . . At least that’s what I 
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think. And even you . . . even you serve some purpose . . . with that 
artichoke head of yours.1 
 
In this sequence, the Fool stresses his idea that everything in the universe 
serves some purpose no matter how useless or worthless it may look, although 
no one can exactly know what purpose it may serve. It is only God that knows it. 
He says, “If it [this pebble] is useless, then everything is useless.”  
I do not believe in God, but the Fool’s words eloquently explain my personal 
sentiment on meaning in life, which is in sharp contrast with Thaddeus Metz’s 
objectivist approach in his book, Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. In this 
paper, I criticize his objectivist approach to meaning in life and instead propose 
my own argument using the concept of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
 
2. Metz’s Interpretation of Meaning in Life and its Problems 
 
Metz classifies theories of meaning in life into two categories, namely, 
supernaturalism and naturalism. The former is the view that meaning in life 
should be interpreted in relationship to a spiritual realm, and the latter is the 
view that meaning in life can be acquired in a purely physical world.2 The latter, 
naturalism, is further divided into two categories, namely, subjectivism and 
objectivism. Subjectivism is the view that meaning in life can be acquired by 
obtaining the objects of one’s “propositional attitudes,” and objectivism is the 
view that one’s life is meaningful “in itself” at least in part regardless of one’s 
propositional attitudes.3 
Metz defends objectivism. He calls his idea “the fundamentality theory.” The 
basic idea of his fundamentality theory is described as follows. 
 
A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she employs her 
reason and in ways that positively orient rationality towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence.4 
 
Metz argues that fundamental conditions of human existence can be interpreted 
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in terms of the good, the true, and the beautiful. For example, Mandela and 
Mother Teresa tried hard to improve devastated people’s fundamental living 
conditions; scientific discoveries by Einstein and Darwin contributed much to 
the progress of fundamental knowledge of humans and the universe; and Picasso 
and Dostoyevsky’s works lead our eyes to the most fundamental layer of the 
world of the beautiful.5 Their lives are all meaningful because they oriented 
their rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence on the level 
of the good, the true, and the beautiful. 
The final version of his fundamentality theory is as follows. 
 
A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without 
violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, employs 
her reason and in ways that either positively orient rationality towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence, or negatively orient it 
towards what threatens them, such as that the worse parts of her life cause 
better parts towards its end by a process that makes for a compelling and 
ideally original life-story; in addition, the meaning in a human person’s 
life is reduced, the more it is negatively oriented towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence or exhibits narrative disvalue.6 
 
This statement is composed of two parts: the part dealing with fundamental 
conditions of human existence and the part dealing with one’s life-story. Metz 
claims, with regard to the former, that the life in which one orients rationality 
towards fundamental conditions of human existence is more meaningful than the 
life in which one does not orient it towards them and, with regard to the latter, 
the life which exhibits narrative value is more meaningful than the life which 
exhibits narrative disvalue. 
Let us see an impressive example that Metz uses in his book. He stresses that 
great meaning is conferred, intuitively, on the lives of Mandela and Mother 
Teresa.  
 
In contrast, their lives would not have been notably important had they 
striven to ensure that everyone’s toenails were regularly trimmed or that 
no one suffered from bad breath, even if these conditions were universally 
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desired (or needed!). Why are the former plausible candidates for 
substantial significance, while the latter are not?7 
 
Here he concludes that the actual lives of Mandela and Mother Teresa are more 
meaningful than the hypothetical lives which are made up solely of trimming 
toenails or preventing bad breath. 
Concerning the life-story, Metz suggests that the lives in which “its bad parts 
cause its later, good parts” by virtue of “personal growth or some other pattern 
that makes for a compelling life-story that is original,” are more meaningful than 
the lives which are solely “repetitive,” “end on a low note,” or “intend to 
replicate another’s whole-life.”8 
One of the most basic presumptions of Metz’s objectivism is that we can 
compare one’s meaning in life with the other, by observing their lives from the 
outside, and can reach the conclusion that one life is more meaningful than the 
other. I have grave doubts about this way of thinking.  
Let us go back to the dialogue in the film La Strada. The central message 
there was that every life has meaning no matter what social value it may have. 
After having seen the film, many viewers would think that the life of Gelsomina, 
which was the continuance of a series of small events and ended in tragedy, was, 
indeed, full of dignity and divinity, comparable to those of sacred religious 
figures. Gelsomina did nothing to orient her rationality towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence, and the tone of her life became dimmer and 
dimmer toward the tragic end point. Hence, according to Metz’s fundamentality 
theory her life should be considered to have very little meaning compared with 
Mandela or Mother Teresa, however, many of us would probably have just the 
opposite impression. For the viewers, Gelsomina is Mandela or Mother Teresa. 
The life of a person of no importance can have equal meaning to the life of a 
distinguished person. Something strange is happening here. We might call it “the 
dialectic of meaning in life.” This, however, is no more than my personal 
impression of the central message of the film. In the following paragraphs I am 
going to translate it into more theoretical language.  
In Metz’s fundamentality theory, “meaning in life” can be interpreted as the 
significance of socially and narratively valuable life. By the words “socially 
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valuable life”9 I mean a life in which one positively orients rationality towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence. According to his final prescription, 
the more social and narrative value a person’s life has, the more her life becomes 
meaningful. 
Let us consider the life of Gelsomina. We can ask, “Is it possible that the life 
of Gelsomina has a great meaning despite the fact that her life was actually one 
without any social or narrative value?,” and answer this question positively. If 
this is correct, Metz’s interpretation of meaning in life in his final prescription 
should be considered to be wrong.  
If we look into the world of literature and religious texts we can easily find 
many stories in which the life of a person without any social or narrative value is 
depicted as having tremendous meaning at the deepest spiritual level. This 
shows that people have never limited meaning in life to a person’s social or 
narrative value, and in some cases they have found great meaning in other 
characteristics such as sincerity, faithfulness, or industriousness. I dare say that 
the life of a person can have grave and utmost meaning even if it is made up of a 
repeated routine of toenail trimming or the prevention of bad breath. 
Let us consider the lives of Mandela or Mother Teresa. Interestingly, it is 
possible to imagine a situation in which they ask themselves, “Is my life 
meaningful despite the fact that my life has been socially and narratively 
valuable to the fullest degree?,” and then they respond negatively to this 
question. For example, it is possible for them to “think” that their lives are 
completely meaningless because they had an experience of telling a lie, only 
once in their life, to their beloved friend, although their lives have been full of 
social and narrative value. This shows that meaning in life is not logically equal 
to social and narrative value (because if they are logically equal it should be that 
it is incorrect to “think” in that way). The important point is that even Mandela 
or Mother Teresa are able to doubt the meaning of their own lives, and those 
who advocate Metz’s theory of meaning in life should “correct” their doubt by 
saying, “Oh, your doubt is wrong. Your life ought to be meaningful according to 
our theory!” 
Even a person whose life fully satisfies Metz’s fundamentality theory is able 
to legitimately doubt the meaningfulness of their own life. Here lies the most 
essential characteristic of the concept of meaning in life.  
                                                     
9 This is not Metz’s phrase but mine.  
 55
In this section, we have demonstrated that Metz’s fundamentality theory fails 
to grasp the meaningfulness of Gelsomina’s life. In the following sections, I will 
leave Gelsomina’s case and inquiry into a much deeper dimension of meaning in 
life. 
 
3. The Heart of Meaning in Life 
 
First, I would like to explain my understanding of the concept of “meaning 
in life.” When we talk about meaning in life, we do not necessarily or solely talk 
about a person’s social and narrative value. In many cases, our question of 
meaning in life takes a form similar to the following. 
 
Alas, does my life like this have any meaning at all? 
 
I believe that what is asked or lamented in the above question constitutes the 
very central content of meaning in life. I want to call it “the heart of meaning in 
life.” This question emerges from the deep layer of my heart when I notice that 
the solid psychological ground which was supporting the affirmative basis of my 
life has suddenly collapsed or disappeared into nothing. The most important 
point here is that the words “my life” in this question point to the life of oneself, 
that is to say, the life of a person who is now writing this text, or the life of a 
person who is now reading this text. “My life” means the life of myself who is 
now writing this text, and “my life” also means the life of the reader of this text, 
that is to say, the life of “yourself,” my dear reader! You are supposed to pose 
this question, “Alas, does my life like this have any meaning at all?” This is not 
a general question which can be equally applied to anyone. This is the question 
that can only be applied to the life of myself when it is uttered by me, or to the 
life of yourself when it is uttered by you. This can be extended to the life of 
him/herself when the question is uttered by him/her. 
A question about “the heart of meaning in life” is completely different from 
a general question about the meaning in life, such as, “What is meaning in life in 
general?” A question about “the heart of meaning in life” is to be answered, in 
principle, only by the person who uttered it. There is no general answer to a 
question about “the heart of meaning in life” that is equally applied to everyone. 
Furthermore, it is very important to understand the following distinction. 
Generally speaking, we can say that a question about “the heart of meaning in 
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life” can be answered by the person who uttered it, whereas in the case of the 
reader of this text, it is only for your own actual life that you can legitimately 
talk about “the heart of meaning in life.” Only for the life one has actually lived 
and is going to live, can one talk about “the heart of meaning in life” and, in the 
case of the reader, it is for your own life that you can talk about it. Let us keep 
this in mind and delve deeper into this topic. 
Metz often says that the life of Mandela or Mother Teresa has significant 
meaning because they positively oriented their rationality toward fundamental 
conditions of human existence. We have to pay special attention here to the fact 
that Metz does not talk about “the heart of meaning in life” because Metz, 
himself, is neither Mandela nor Mother Teresa, that is to say, he is living the life 
neither of Mandela nor of Mother Teresa. Metz is talking about the meaning in 
life of persons other than himself. Metz can talk about “the heart of meaning in 
life” only when he refers to Metz’s own actual life. This is the logical conclusion 
that is derived from the concept of “the heart of meaning in life.” And we should 
note that throughout his book, Metz never talks about “the heart of meaning in 
life.” From my viewpoint, Metz fails to discuss the most important aspect of 
meaning in life in his academic discussion of this topic. His philosophical 
analysis has not yet reached the layer that I want to make most clear. 
Metz might classify my position under a certain type of subjectivism but I 
think this is wrong because subjectivists, in Metz’s sense, do not also talk about 
“the heart of meaning in life.” According to Metz, subjectivism is the view that 
meaning in life can be acquired by the acquisition of the objects of one’s 
“propositional attitudes.” It is clear that in this kind of subjectivism “we” can 
talk about “his” or “her” meaning in life by referring to their acquisition of the 
objects of their propositional attitudes. However, this is not what “the heart of 
meaning in life” really points to because “the heart of meaning in life” of his or 
her life can only be legitimately talked about by him/herself, not by us. Hence, 
my position is not even subjectivism in Metz’s sense. 
For instance, Metz describes a dominant form of subjectivism as follows. 
 
(S1)  A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she 
obtains the objects of her actual pro-attitudes such as desires and goals.10 
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In this sentence Metz talks about someone else’s meaning in life. This shows 
that what Metz is talking about is, by definition, never “the heart of meaning in 
life.”11 Metz discussed subjectivism throughout Chapter Nine, but my position 
in this paper is not dealt with in any pages in that chapter. 
And it is crystal clear that my position is not supernaturalism because I do 
not have any religious belief. Metz’s classification of meaning in life fails to 
catch “the heart of meaning in life” in my sense. 
Of course, it is possible for Mandela or Mother Teresa to utter, “Alas, does 
my life like this have any meaning at all?” In this case, their question is without 
doubt one about “the heart of meaning in life.” However, when we ask “Does 
the life of Mandela or Mother Teresa have any meaning at all?,” we completely 
fail to pose the question about “the heart of meaning in life” for Mandela or 
Mother Teresa.  
It is true that as a result of the accomplishments of Mandela and Mother 
Teresa many people’s fundamental living conditions were dramatically 
improved. In this sense we sometimes say their lives had great meaning and this 
makes sense in our ordinary language. But it is important to know that here “the 
heart of meaning in life” in Mandela or Mother Teresa is never being talked 
about. It is made possible only when they themselves talk about meaning in their 
own actual life. 
In the same vein, I can talk about “the heart of meaning in life” only when I 
talk about the meaning in my own actual life. However, at the same time, my 
judgment on meaning in life will be attained under the strong influence of the 
state of the human relationships that surround me. For example, whether I was 
able to make my friends and/or my family happy would play a crucial role in 
evaluating meaning in my life. Hence, whilst it is only I who can legitimately 
talk about “the heart of meaning in life” in the case of myself, it is human 
relationships and broader contexts surrounding me that strongly assist in 
determining the evaluation of meaning in my life. 
Let us turn our eyes to “my counterfactual life.” Is it possible for me to talk 
about “the heart of meaning in life” in my counterfactual life? For example, it 
makes sense to say, “if I were a billionaire, my life would be tremendously 
meaningful,” but I must say that in this case I fail to talk about “the heart of 
meaning in life.” The reason for this is as follows. 
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As was discussed earlier, “the heart of meaning in life” refers to what is 
asked or lamented in the question, “Alas, does my life like this have any 
meaning at all?” Here we have to pay special attention to the phrase “my life 
like this.” This phrase clearly means “my actual life like this,” not “my 
counterfactual life like that.” Hence, when I talk about “the heart of meaning in 
life” I must be talking about my actual life like this, not my counterfactual life 
like that. When I am talking about meaning in life in my counterfactual life in 
which I am a billionaire, I am not answering the question, “Alas, does my life 
like this have any meaning at all?” because in my actual life I am not a 
billionaire; I am no more than an upper-middle-class college teacher. It is only 
when I talk about my actual life in which I am an upper-middle-class worker 
that I can talk about “the heart of meaning in life” in the life of myself. Of 
course, it makes sense for me to say,“if I were a billionaire, my life would be 
tremendously meaningful,” but in using this sentence I can only mean something 
other than “the heart of meaning in life” that we have been discussing so far. 
Then what about meaning in my life in the past? Is it possible for me to talk 
about “the heart of meaning in life” as of my life one year ago? Before thinking 
about this question, let us examine what the phrase “my life like this” means in a 
strict sense. In this phrase, “this” means my actual life, and my actual life is the 
life I am experiencing here and now which is made possible by the accumulation 
of what I have experienced up until the present. I can talk about “the heart of 
meaning in life” solely in respect of my life of this kind. Hence, it is now clear 
that in the case of my life in the past I cannot talk about “the heart of meaning in 
life” because “my life like this” is not the phrase that denotes a certain 
time-point in life in the past. Of course, it makes sense to say, “if I were the 
person that I was one year ago, my life would be more meaningful than this,” 
but this is not the sentence which stands for “the heart of meaning in life” one 
year ago in my life. According to this line of thought, we can also conclude that 
I cannot talk about “the heart of meaning in life” for my life in the future. 
It might be helpful here to refer to Theo van Willigenburg’s concept of “an 
internalist view on the value of life.” According to van Willigenburg, the 
goodness of life is “in some sense always related to what is, or could be, 
experienced as valuable by the person who is leading that life,” and the 
important thing is “not whether others value these goods, but whether I value 
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them from my perspective.”12 At first sight, his argument looks similar to mine; 
however, he believes that the goodness of a person’s life cannot be determined 
only by that person’s self-judgment. Hence, whilst he uses the term “internalist,” 
he actually supports the idea that the value of one’s life is determined both by 
one’s own internal judgment and by the external facts and/or contexts. He 
concludes that “my internalist position rejects the experience requirement posed 
by experiential subjectivism.”13  His discussion is complicated and twisted 
because he does not clearly distinguish between the concepts of value, goodness, 
and meaning. It seems to me that although the value and goodness of one’s life 
cannot be determined only by one’s inner judgment, with regard to “the heart of 
meaning in life,” it ought to be determined in a purely internalist fashion, that is, 
only by the judgment of the person who is leading that life. 
What I am arguing is not that objective approaches are totally senseless, but 
that although objective approaches can accurately explain some ordinary usages 
of the words “meaning in life,” they can never grasp the layer of “the heart of 
meaning in life” we have discussed so far. 
Metz criticizes “first-person” approaches to meaning in life because most of 
us “are concerned about whether, say, the lives of our spouses and children are 
meaningful, and not merely because the meaning of our own life might depend 
on the meaningfulness of theirs.”14 Of course I understand what he wants to say, 
and I agree with him that in our ordinary life we usually think like that. 
Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the “meaningfulness” in Metz’s 
words is something completely different from “the heart of meaning in life” in 
our sense. I can never talk about the meaningfulness of my spouse’s life or my 
children’s lives at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
 
4. “The Heart of Meaning in Life” Cannot Be Compared 
 
An important conclusion is to be derived from the above discussion, that is, 
it is totally impossible to compare “the heart of meaning in life” among people. 
Meaning in life is incomparable at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
First, it is impossible to compare my “meaning in life” with other’s 
“meaning in life” at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” The reason is 
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simple. It is impossible to talk about “the heart of meaning in life” in the life of 
others, and hence, it is logically impossible to compare it with mine. Metz writes 
in his book that, “For all I know, my life is, so far, more pleasurable than Emily 
Dickinson’s was, but less meaningful than Albert Einstein’s.”15 I understand that 
here he is talking about his version of the objective interpretation of meaning in 
life. If he were talking about “the heart of meaning in life” in my sense, what he 
is talking about would be total nonsense. 
Second, it is impossible to compare someone’s “meaning in life” with 
another’s “meaning in life” at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” I cannot 
talk about“the heart of meaning in life” in the life of others, hence, it is logically 
impossible to compare them. It is logically impossible for me to compare Metz’s 
“meaning in life” with Einstein’s “meaning in life” at the level of “the heart of 
meaning in life.” It is also logically impossible for me to compare Mandela or 
Mother Teresa’s “meaning in life” with that of an ordinary, mediocre person at 
that level. 
Third, it is impossible to compare “meaning in life” in my actual life with 
“meaning in life” in my counterfactual life at the level of “the heart of meaning 
in life.” The reason for this was explained earlier. This may be one of the 
important points that distinguishes my theory from other subjectivist ones. 
The above discussion shows that “the heart of meaning in life” in my life 
cannot be compared with anything at all. This means that it is impossible to say 
that meaning in my life is greater or lesser than meaning in some other life when 
we are talking about “the heart of meaning in life.” It transcends all 
comparisons. 
This means that it is completely wrong for me to answer the question, “Alas, 
does my life like this have any meaning at all?” in a form such as “my life has a 
greater meaning than such and such” or “my life has a lesser meaning than such 
and such.” The only possible answer will be either “my life has meaning” or 
“my life does not have meaning.” The answer ought to be one of two values, a 
binary yes-or-no, black-or-white, and there is no ambiguous gray zone between 
the above two answers. This may sound counter-intuitive, but if any 
comparisons are to be prohibited at the level of “the heart of meaning in life,” 
this should be the only conclusion to this matter. It exists, or it does not exist. 
There is no third answer between them. What is questioned here is not the 
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question of comparison or degree, but the question of existence. We are now in 
the realm of ontology. 
Of course, it sometimes happens to me that I cannot provide this kind of 
yes-or-no answer to the question of “the heart of meaning in life,” but this is not 
a big problem. What I argue here is that if I can actually answer the question, my 
answer will have to take the yes-or-no style. An interesting conclusion derived 
from this is that if I feel that my life has even just a bit meaning, then it means 
my life has complete, fullest meaning at the level of “the heart of meaning in 
life.” If I am thinking a bit like that, fullest meaning has already been endowed 
to me. It is only when I think that my life does not have any meaning at all that I 
am allowed to say that my life does not have meaning. It seems to me that there 
is an interesting asymmetry between the existence and non-existence of meaning 
in life at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
You may think that I am comparing “existence of meaning” and 
“non-existence of meaning” whilst I am arguing that meaning in life cannot be 
compared, and because this is an apparent contradiction, my reasoning is totally 
wrong. I do not necessarily think so. This is closely connected with the 
discussion of anti-natalism. For example, I can say that I exist now, and this 
makes sense, but when I say this I do not necessarily compare my existence with 
my non-existence. It is very hard, or almost impossible, to imagine what it really 
means that I do not exist now. Of course I can “think” about a possible world in 
which I do not exist whilst other things do exist, however, it is impossible to 
“imagine” what that possible world looks like in a strict sense because in that 
possible world the subject, this I, who can perceive that possible world from the 
inside, does not exist at all. In order to compare two possible worlds I must be 
able to imagine what they look like; therefore, it is impossible to compare the 
world in which I exist with the possible world in which I do not exist.16 We 
have to completely distinguish imagining from thinking. 
If this reasoning is correct, then the same thing can hold true in the case of 
meaning in life. When I talk about the existence of meaning in life, I do not 
compare it with the non-existence of meaning in life. No comparison is needed 
in talking about meaning in life at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” I 
understand that this discussion requires a more sophisticated and detailed 
analysis to be undertaken elsewhere. 
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It seems to me that to answer “yes” to the question of “the heart of meaning 
in life” is to give affirmation to the whole process of my life up until the present. 
This suggests that “the heart of meaning in life” can be talked about for one’s 
whole life up until the present, not for one’s part life in the past.17 This should 
further lead to “birth affirmation,” saying yes to the fact that I have been born 
into this world. In contrast, to answer “no” to the question is to negate the whole 
process of my life and this will lead to “birth negation,” saying no to the fact 
that I have been born, that is to say, “better never to have been.” Here the 
philosophy of meaning in life gets connected with the philosophy of birth 
affirmation, which I have been inquiring into in recent years.18 
In the previous section I argued that the life of Gelsomina can have a great 
meaning despite the fact that her life was actually one without any social or 
narrative value, and, in some cases, the life of a person can have grave and 
utmost meaning even if it is made up of a repeated routine of toenail trimming 
or bad breath preventing. Metz criticizes this way of thinking. Remember Metz’s 
words: “[T]heir lives would not have been notably important had they striven to 
ensure that everyone’s toenails were regularly trimmed or that no one suffered 
from bad breath, even if these conditions were universally desired (or needed!).” 
Here let us think deeply about the above case from the viewpoint of “the heart of 
meaning in life.” 
First, imagine the life of mine that is made up of a repeated routine of toenail 
trimming or bad breath preventing. You may think that such a life does not have 
any meaning at all. Nevertheless, this is not my actual life. This is my 
counterfactual life. Hence, I can never make a judgment on this kind of 
counterfactual life of mine at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.”  
Second, imagine the life of a third person that is made up of a repeated 
routine of toenail trimming or bad breath preventing. As we discussed earlier, it 
is impossible to talk about other people’s meaning in life at the level of “the 
heart of meaning in life.” The situation is the same as in the first case. I have to 
say Metz’s words above appear to be totally senseless from our viewpoint. 
Third, imagine a case in which a person whose life is made up of a repeated 
routine of toenail trimming or bad breath preventing says that “my life has a 
significant meaning at the level of ‘the heart of meaning in life’.” What should 
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paper. 
18 For example, see Morioka (2011). 
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we think of this person’s words? I believe that all we have to do is to accept the 
words as they are and never say that they are right or wrong. We should refrain 
from saying that such a life has lesser meaning than Mandela or Mother Teresa, 
or that such a life does not have much meaning at all. The same thing can be 
said about a person who is no more than just alive and whose life is nothing 
more than that. 
There remains a question on which we have to make a deliberate 
consideration. That is the question of whether the life of those who deeply injure 
others should also be considered, in some cases, to have meaning at the level of 
“the heart of meaning in life.” Let us consider the life of Hitler as an extreme 
example. First, it is possible to imagine a case in which my life is just the same 
as Hitler’s, but this is the case of my counterfactual life and my actual life is 
completely different from it, hence, I cannot talk about meaning in this 
hypothetical case at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.”  
Second, then, what about my actual life? I have to say that in my actual life I 
have injured and afflicted many people, and even now I might be letting 
someone suffer from what I am doing to him/her. In such a life of mine, can I 
say that my life has meaning at the level of “the heart of meaning in life” in spite 
of the above fact? It is extremely difficult to draw a definite conclusion for this 
case, but I believe that I am able to answer yes to this question. This is made 
possible only when I sincerely review the injury and suffering I have done to 
others, and only when I think deeply about how I am going to rework my 
relationship with them, and only when I think deeply about how I am going to 
make relationships with others whom I encounter in the future. 
Third, what if someone like Hitler says that his life is full of meaning at the 
level of “the heart of meaning in life”? He would say that what he has done to 
people has significant meaning because he has successfully flourished in a way 
of life which no one other than him can ever accomplish in human history, and 
hence, even if what he has done to people has been nothing but a series of grave 
injuries and suffering, his life should be considered to have significant meaning 
at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” Many people would feel disgusted 
and nauseated hearing his words, and, emotionally speaking, I too feel like 
giving him a slap on the cheek. However, interestingly, if he is talking about his 
own “heart of meaning in life, there are no mistakes in the use of the words 
“meaning in life” in his argument. Hence, no matter how hard it is for us to 
accept his words, all we have to do is to accept them as they are, and we have to 
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refrain from affirming or negating his argument on meaning in life. If we 
criticize him and say, “your life has no meaning at all,” these words should be 
considered totally wrong as long as they are said about “the heart of meaning in 
life.” We have to keep in mind that here lies the true uniqueness of the concept 
of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
Following that, we have to criticize him and argue that his whole life is 
ethically wrong and is never ethically justified. We have to say to him that a life 
of afflicting a great number of people should be ethically negated and should 
never again happen in this world. Although “the heart of meaning in life” and 
“goodness or evilness of life” are interconnected, the level of “meaning” and the 
level of “goodness/badness” should be clearly separated from each other in their 
ontological status. With regard to others’ lives, we cannot make a judgment on 
the former, but we can do it on the latter. 
Then, if there is a recreational drug user/addict whose life has never been 
improved, and he has never tried to improve the fundamental conditions in our 
society, but is fully satisfied with his life from the bottom of his heart, can we 
say that his life has meaning? From a common sense view, we would say that 
such a life does not have much meaning, but strictly speaking, if he himself 
believes that his life is full of meaning at the level of “the heart of meaning in 
life,” we cannot affirm or negate his words and all we have to do is just accept 
his opinion about his meaning in life as it is stated. Of course I will never 
recommend such a life to others and I will argue that one’s life free from such 
drug addiction would be by far the better life. Nevertheless, at the level of “the 
heart of meaning in life,” I dare say that we ought to refrain from judging the 
meaning in life of others from the outside and just accept their words as they are. 
Let us go back to Gelsomina’s case. We pointed out that whilst most of us 
would find meaning in Gelsomina’s life, Metz’s fundamentality theory cannot 
find so much meaning in her life because she did not try to orient her rationality 
towards fundamental conditions of human existence.  
Then, what does the theory of “the heart of meaning in life” say about 
Gelsomina’s life? The answer is already clear. At the level of “the heart of 
meaning in life,” we cannot talk about the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of 
Gelsomina’s life, nor can we compare it with that of another person’s life. What 
Gelsomina did was just to live her “miserable” life honestly and sincerely. The 
meaning of Gelsomina’s life transcends all of us at the level of its heart. 
In this paper I have demonstrated that there exists “the heart of meaning in 
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life,” a layer that cannot be compared with anything, in the layers of the question 
of meaning in life. I believe that this layer constitutes the very central content of 
meaning in life because the question of meaning in life becomes a most pure and 
painful one, not when it is posed in an objective form, but when it is posed and 
directed toward your own actual, irreplaceable life. 
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